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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
AUTHOR MEETS CRITICS:

BORN BELIEVERS?
MARK SIDERITS
In “What Kind of an Illusion is the Illusion of Self”, Karsten Struhl brings up an
important question, and develops an interesting answer. There is much here that I agree
with. There are, though, two questions raised by his paper that I believe may warrant
further investigation. These are: (1) is the self a phenomenal illusion? and if so, (2) is
its being a feature of human psychology a straightforward result of natural selection?
How the second question should be addressed might seem to depend on how the first
is answered. But in part because it will prove difficult to work out just how to approach
(1), I shall start with (2).
To say that the self is a phenomenal illusion is to say at least this much: that
something that is readily mistaken as evidence for the existence of a self commonly
appears in the experience of ordinary humans. Let us suppose we understand what this
comes to—perhaps that there is a raw “what-it-is-like”-ness to our experience that gives
rise to the belief that we have selves.1 At least one such belief is that the experiences
presently occurring are had by a subject. So if the self is a phenomenal illusion, then
ordinary sensory experience would be given to us in a way that leads us to
spontaneously affirm that they are given to or for a particular experiencing subject, me.
Let us similarly suppose that features of our experience render it difficult not to judge
that this me is an enduring substance located in my head, something that serves to
ground certain synchronic and diachronic unities and is the author of my actions. Let
us suppose, that is, that the standard characterization of a self—as the persisting
substance that grounds the synchronic and diachronic identity of the person in the guise
of experiencing subject and agent—is supported, albeit misleadingly, by the felt
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Struhl suggests that the notion of a phenomenal self should be understood in this way when he uses
such expressions as ‘the phenomenal appearance of the self’ (136).
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character of our experience. To suppose that the experiences of humans ordinarily have
this phenomenal character might be akin to what Buddhists claim when they say that
the “I”-sense (ahaṃkāra) is a human universal, something common to all
unenlightened humans (and perhaps to non-human sentient beings as well).
Buddhists explain the universality of the “I”-sense by calling it the result of
“beginningless ignorance.” Their explanation builds on the assumption that the series
of rebirths of which one is the latest instance has no beginning. Since each life in such
a series resulted from intentional actions performed under the sway of ignorance in its
predecessor life, it would then follow that the illusory “I”-sense has always been with
us. For those who do not believe in a beginningless series of rebirths but do think that
the self illusion is rooted in our phenomenology, there may be other ways to explain
how things appear to us. Those of a naturalistic bent will be particularly tempted to
bring selectionist machinery to bear on the question. But which sort of selection, natural
or cultural? If the “I”-sense derives from a phenomenal character of experience that is
widely shared among humans, is this because a nervous system so organized as to yield
this character was selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptation? Or is it
rather that the human genome merely facilitated the development of human culture,
and that among the various resulting cultures, those that promoted the development of
an “I”-sense had greater long-term success?2
There are passages in Struhl’s paper that appear to credit both types of process with
a role, e.g., “From an evolutionary point of view (both biological and cultural
evolution) the illusion of self was a necessary illusion” (128). But then there are also
passages like this: “natural selection built into our species the illusion of self” (129).
And this: “their brains are still organized by the imperatives of that genome…. The
way the human brain is naturally organized to do this employs the device of the
phenomenal self” (135). Such passages suggest that culture plays at best an auxiliary
role, perhaps one of merely facilitating the manifestation of traits already programmed
into the nervous system by the human genome. Now if the self is a phenomenal illusion,
then knowing its cause may matter to how we are to address it. Are we born believers
in a self, or does that belief depend on a particular process of enculturation?
It may be no accident that the passages where Struhl seems to favor a naturalselection explanation are also ones that invoke the support of the evolutionary
psychologist Richard Wright (2017). The “just-so” stories of evolutionary psychology
rely on the idea that processes of natural selection led to a human brain that is
configured to predispose us to think and act in certain predictable ways. In the present
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To say this is not the same thing as saying that the self is ‘socially constructed’. What is to be explained
here is that the illusion of a self is a human universal. A cultural selectionist account of some
phenomenon acknowledges the diversity of human cultures, but explains the widespread sharing of the
phenomenon across different cultures by claiming that those early human cultures in which the
phenomenon occurred had a competitive advantage over cultures lacking that feature. That the
phenomenon is now to be found across many distinct cultures is not explained by facts about human
biology, but rather by facts concerning what drives competition among human cultures. To say that this
is true of the self illusion is perfectly compatible with the thought that the self may be socially constructed
in quite different ways in different cultures.
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context the idea would then be that our brains are hard-wired to generate experiences
of such a character as to produce a pre-reflective “I”-sense, and this is explained by the
enhanced reproductive fitness that sense conferred on our ancestors in the environment
of evolutionary adaptation. But as always with the explanations proffered by
evolutionary psychology, this account requires that we suppose the brain is organized
around a number of heritable mental modules. And this seems implausible given what
we now know about the brain’s plasticity: damage to one part of the brain is often
followed by other parts of the brain taking up tasks formerly performed in the damaged
region. A plausible natural-selectionist explanation can be developed for the Kanizsa
square illusion. The human visual system computes shapes through detection first of
color and then of edges, with the latter computation relying on color-shading gradients.
The system deals with cases where borders are only partially delineated by inducing
brightness and thereby producing regions of heightened contrast. And so the square one
seems to see appears brighter than the encompassing white. That the illusion is
universal can be explained by the relative success conferred, by a vision system so
organized, on those of our animal ancestors in whom such a system first occurred
(through a series of transcription errors). Shape detection is clearly important to the
success of sighted animals, and this configuration works well enough in environments
typical of the environment of evolutionary adaptation. Much of the neural organization
involved is actually not in the visual cortex of the brain but on the retina. So the
hypothesis that such organization might be heritable is quite plausible. Far less so the
hypothesis that there is a single heritable feature of brain organization responsible for
generating the phenomenal illusion of an “I.” For think of all the tasks this illusory
appearance is meant to perform: grounding both synchronic and diachronic unifications
of several different sorts, serving as subject of experience, serving as agent of action,
etc. The large number of different systems that would be necessary to generate a
phenomenal “I”-sense in the large variety of relevant stimulus conditions represents a
serious engineering challenge. Add in the plasticity of the human brain and the odds
against an illusory phenomenal self being the result of natural selection seem quite
daunting.3
To say this is not to say that there is nothing in the human brain at birth that might
help explain the development of a phenomenal “I”-sense. Here are some examples of
infant behaviors that might well be innate. Neonates look intently at highly stylized
pictures of smiling faces. Infants are quite good at detecting the direction at which
another person is looking. And they use this ability to try to coordinate attention to
objects in the shared environment—to bring about joint attention with possible
caregivers. It seems reasonable to suppose that each of these is subserved by some
feature of the infant brain. Together they and certain other capacities constitute what
Bogdan (2010, 31) calls the infant’s “naïve psychology,” something that will over time
3

Indeed Struhl quotes (125) Hood to this effect: ‘The brain has many distributed jobs…. [T]he sense of
self that most of us experience is not to be found in any one area. Rather it emerges out of the orchestra
of different brain processes like a symphony of the self, just as Buddha and Hume said’ (Hood 2012,
xii).
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be replaced by the full-fledged theory that he calls “common-sense psychology.” And
it is not difficult to fashion natural-selection explanations for these and other individual
components of the infant’s naïve psychology. The neonate’s response to the “smileyface” stimulus, for instance, will clearly play a role in fostering infant-caregiver
bonding, particularly when, starting a few days after birth, the infant begins to smile in
response to the smiles of others. Gaze detection is likewise crucial to achieving
coordinated or joint attention, something that will help in satisfaction of the infant’s
nurturance needs given its reliance on adult caregivers. These capacities might be
thought of as forming the rudiments of a theory of mind. But caution is called for here,
since it would be unjustifiable to attribute to the infant anything as sophisticated as the
construction and testing of hypotheses concerning the springs of human behavior. All
of that will, on Bogdan’s account, come much later in the developmental story, with
the achievement of what he calls common-sense psychology in later childhood. The
important point here is that each component behavior can be understood as involving a
neural mechanism that was selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptation.
The situation of the human infant is, after all, quite dire, given that it is the outcome
of the obstetrical dilemma posed by human bipedalism. The narrowing of the birth
canal that was required for live birth in a bipedal mammal has made humans an
extremely altricial species; infant survival depends entirely on adult care-giving. (It has
also meant that live birth requires the cooperation of other adults besides the mother,
so a high degree of sociality is also necessary for survival of the species.) Consequently,
if a tendency to gaze more fixedly at smiling faces were a heritable feature of the human
brain, then the spontaneous appearance of this feature in the brains of certain of our
ancestors would have given them some advantage in having their nurturance needs met,
thereby accounting for its prevalence in the species today. And the behavior involves a
sufficiently stereotyped stimulus that it is not difficult to imagine its being tied to a
particular brain structure. A heritable mental module for paying differential attention
to smiling faces does not seem all that far-fetched.
It is also plausible that without these components of “naïve psychology,” the child
would not develop (typically beginning at around age four) the full-fledged theory of
mind that constitutes our adult common-sense psychology. But, argue Bogdan and
others, it is only with the development of this theory that the child comes to attribute
mental states to itself. And this seems to mark the point at which the child can
meaningfully be said to have a sense of self. The achievement of a sense of self follows
on the development of a theory of mind that is first applied to others and only then
applied to oneself.4 This would suggest that the phenomenal self could only appear
later in childhood and not at birth. And insofar as the older child has been subjected to
socialization in its home culture, it becomes more plausible that a phenomenal self is
the product of socialization in a particular culture. Now Struhl has discussed the various
4

Struhl seems to agree: “There is good reason to think that the phenomenal sense of self was initially
constructed in the early stages of the child’s life through interaction with parents or other caretakers”
(123). But then there is, “it is elicited and turned on through our early childhood interactions with
caretakers” (132), suggesting that his phenomenal self is innate but only becomes manifest through
normal developmental processes.
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benefits that come to individuals and their society from their having an “I”-sense.5 But
cultures vary across space and across time, and such variation sets the stage for cultural
evolution. So it is plausible that if there is a phenomenal self, it is the result not of
natural selection but of cultural selection. Ordinary people have the “I”-sense not
because they were born with it, but because they were socialized in one of the cultures
that developed strategies for inculcating such a sense—and that thereby proved more
successful than those early human cultures that did not. Like human language, an “I”sense would have arisen in the presence of certain biological precursors, but only
because of processes of cultural selection.6
This result, however, makes it appear less likely that the self can be a phenomenal
illusion. Recall that we began with two questions: (1) is the self a phenomenal illusion?
and if so, (2) is its being a feature of human psychology a straightforward result of
natural selection? Our negative answer to the second question makes a negative answer
to the first more likely. To see why, we must say more about what it might mean to call
the phenomenal self an illusion. A phenomenal illusion, we are told, is a phenomenal
presentation brought about by the way our mind naturally structures our experience and
that strongly inclines us to hold a false belief. Struhl uses the Kanizsa square illusion
as his example, but there are many others, including most famously the Müller-Lyer
illusion. Buddhist discussions of illusions7 often cite examples involving
malfunctioning sensory systems, as in the net of hairs seen by those with the ophthalmic
disorder known as timira, the two moons seen by someone who is drunk or dizzy, or
the conch shell seen as yellow by one with jaundice. While one might say that the mind
structures the experiences involved, this is not how the mind naturally structures them.
But Buddhists also cite mirages, the Fata Morgana or City of the Gandharvas, the circle
of fire one sees when a torch is rapidly twirled, and the apparent motion of trees on the
river bank seen by someone on a boat. One might also include here the vile smell that
clean water presents to the properly functioning olfactory system of pretas.8 Unlike the
net of hairs and the two moons, these all involve the normal functioning of sensory
systems.
Struhl uses a cognitive penetrability test to distinguish between phenomenal
illusions and what he calls cognitive illusions: if knowledge that the induced belief is
false dispels the illusion, then it is cognitive, if not then it is phenomenal. The MüllerLyer illusion is phenomenal because even after one has carefully measured the two
lines and ascertained that they are the same length, one line continues to appear longer
than the other. But does this test work for all cases? The case of the moving trees
5

Buddhists agree about the benefits. See Milinda Pañha 40.
For the parallel case that language use likewise has biological precursors but developed through
processes of cultural evolution, see discussion in Thomas Kirby 2018.
7
In line with their disjunctivism, Buddhist epistemologists call these cases of pseudo-perception
(pratyakṣābhāsa). Dignāga famously claims that these do not involve conceptual superimposition. This
would go some way toward explaining their supposed cognitive impenetrability.
8
Rebirth as a preta comes from bad karma, the fruit of that karma being the hunger and thirst that result
when their sensory systems make all food and drink revolting. The preta’s sensory systems are
functioning properly when they make nourishing food smell and taste like feces.
6
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illusion might give us pause. Here is an updated version: the inbound train one is on is
stopped at a station, and an outbound train is stopped on the opposite track. One sees
the other train depart, but a moment later kinesthetic feedback alerts one to the fact that
the train one is on is moving. One no longer sees the other train moving. The illusory
motion of the other train is dispelled by new information. A Buddhist epistemologist
might object that motion is itself a conceptual superimposition, something not
perceived but inferred: since everything is momentary, nothing exists long enough to
move from one location to another. And if attribution of motion is conceptual, then it
is no wonder that the illusory motion of the other train should prove to be cognitively
penetrable. But then if our awareness of motion is not tied to a specific phenomenal
character—if motion is something not perceived but inferred—we must begin to
wonder just what phenomenal character amounts to.9
Such doubts are only amplified when we come to the case of the phenomenal self.
To call the self a phenomenal illusion is to say that our experience possesses the
phenomenal character that leads to our judging that we have a self. It is not just Hume,
though, who fails to find a self when “looking within” and thus presumably
investigating the phenomenal character of our experience. Take the case of the subject
of experience that is supposedly presented when we reflect on our own experiential
lives. The closest it seems we can get to giving phenomenal content to our conviction
that there is such a subject is the sense that in addition to the intentional object of a
particular experience, there is also the awareness that takes it as object. But this
awareness turns out to be elusive: it is said to be something the awareness of which is
necessarily non-thetic. This is the feature that led Brentano to characterize the
consciousness component of an experience as nebenbei or “by the way”—always
glimpsed as something just receding over the horizon, something caught only out of
the corner of the eye (Montague 2017, 363). And if the cognizing activity of the
experiencing subject should be beyond our grasp, what does this say about the supposed
author of this activity?
The belief that this subject of individual experiences is also something that endures
is said to be induced at least in part by the phenomena of episodic and autobiographical
memory. But what might be the phenomenal character of such rememberings that
would support this belief? Consider a case where a present stimulus triggers a memory
of an earlier experience: I see a mango in the market and remember feeling pleasure
when I tasted my first mango years ago. I say, “I want that mango because it reminds
me of the first time I ate one.” My report is in the first person, and it reflects an assumed
diachronic personal identity. But what is there in the phenomenal character of my
experience that could be said to make that assumption seem inescapable? To see the
difficulty here, consider an impersonal formulation: present visual experience triggers
a memory trace that is the product of a past gustatory experience in the causal series of
9

Full disclosure: Galen Strawson listed me as among those who subscribe to what he calls the Great
Silliness. (See “Magic, Illusions, and Zombies: An Exchange”, Daniel C. Dennett, reply by Galen
Strawson, New York Review of Books, 3 April 2018.) This makes me something of a qualia-skeptic. My
argument here, though, will be that even qualia-philes should reject the claim that the self illusion is like
illusions that they think involve qualia.
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mental events associated with this brain and body, and this in turn causes the formation
of a desire. The impersonal formulation obviously omits the “I” of the first-person
report. And if we think of “I” as an indexical,10 we may wonder how the impersonal
formulation can do the same work as the first-person formulation. Indexicals are
necessary in order for information to guide action: the map is useless for navigation if
one doesn’t know where here is. So how can the impersonal formulation rationalize
my action of buying the mango? But the impersonal formulation does contain an
indexical: “this.” The expression “the causal series of mental events associated with
this brain and body” would seem to do all the same work, albeit in a more verbose way.
What this should suggest is that there is no distinctive phenomenal character expressed
by reports from the first-person perspective. The “I” is the classic case of a many
masquerading as a one: the many strongly casually connected psychophysical elements
masquerading as a single enduring substance.11 It is our habitual use of the convenient
designator “I” that leads to the sense of diachronic identity. There is nothing in our
mistake that is the analog of the white square we see when we look at the Kanizsa
figure.
If the illusion of self is of the cognitive and not the phenomenal sort, then it should
be cognitively penetrable. And Struhl is of course right that merely rehearsing the
philosophical arguments against the existence of the self does not by itself extirpate the
“I”-sense. By all accounts, Hume was not an arhat. But here it might be useful to
consider what Abhidharma says about the matter. The goal of overcoming suffering by
extinguishing the “I”-sense is achieved, they claim, by ridding oneself of the
defilements (kleśas). And here they draw a distinction between those that are
extinguished through wisdom (prajñā) alone, and those whose extinction requires
deployment of techniques of meditation (bhāvanā). Among the former are the variety
of views concerning an existent person (satkāyadṛṣṭi). So explicit belief in a self should
be corrigible by way of a strictly theoretical exercise. Such views are classed under the
category of delusion (moha), the third of the three defilements. But many of the
dispositions classed under the other two defilements are more straightforwardly
affective in nature, and the uprooting of these is said to require meditative practice.
Typical of the defilements classed here are such reactive attitudes as anger, resentment
and jealousy. To take a simple example, suppose that the mango I hanker after was just
purchased by another shopper, whom I now see eating it with great delight. I feel
jealousy. This response is predicated on the premise that my own pleasure is of more
value than that of others. This in turn involves the presupposition that there is such a
thing as what makes events in this causal series belong to me, to be mine. Even if we
know this presupposition to be false, we might expect the attitude to nonetheless arise.
And occurrences of this attitude reinforce the disposition, which in turn reinforces our
tacit engagement with the “I”-sense. The meditative counter-measure recommended
here is not mindfulness or concentration meditation, but the cultivation of counter10

For discussion of whether “me” is an indexical or instead a Millian name (a “mere tag”), see Echeverri
forthcoming.
11
See Parfit 1984, 206 for “strong connectedness”.
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virtues, affective habits that help us unlearn such deeply engrained vices as anger,
resentment and jealousy. Given that we have been socialized to construct narrative
selves—for all the reasons that Struhl describes—and narrative selves are built around
prudential concern and the happiness-seeking project, this will prove difficult. It’s hard
to learn to take pleasure in the other shopper’s delight in that mango and not regret my
missing out. But this is just what the meditative practices of sympathetic joy and lovingkindness are meant to instill.
The lesson to be learned from this is that extirpating the “I”-sense is not a matter of
eliminating a certain phenomenal character from our experience of the world. The “I”sense is not a delusive phenomenal character. “‘I’-sense” is the name of a bundle of
cognitive and affective habits that continuously reinscribe belief in a self that serves as
center of meaning and value. How the world appears to us is not changed when this
sense is extirpated. What changes is just how we reflexively respond to the world.
There may be a phenomenal square in the Kanizsa illusion, but there is little reason to
think that there is a comparable phenomenal self involved in the illusion of self.
There are two further points I think might be made. The first concerns a third way
in which Struhl thinks the self might be thought to be illusory, besides as phenomenal
illusion and as cognitive illusion; this involves the Freudian notion of wish-fulfilment
as a mechanism for generating illusions (121). He points to the fact that belief in an
enduring self might help satisfy the wish that our lives have meaning, a wish that is in
danger of being undermined by the fact of our transience. It is not clear that this
mechanism can explain how the illusion of self is generated, however. One cannot
sense that one’s happiness-seeking project is threatened by one’s mortality unless one
already sees the events in this life as one’s own, as events that are experienced by and
can have meaning for this self. The Freudian wish-fulfilment mechanism might explain
resistance to evidence that there is no self, but it cannot, on pain of circularity, explain
our coming to have the belief that there is such a self.
My second and final point about Struhl’s paper is this. Some will criticize Struhl’s
use of results from cognitive science and evolutionary psychology to explicate
Buddhist ideas. And it is true that the naturalism of such of the authors Struhl cites as
Dennett, Hood, Metzinger and Wright is incompatible with the uniformly antiphysicalist stance of Indian Buddhist philosophy. But it is not clear to me why this
should be thought to matter. The question I take Struhl to be addressing is what sort of
illusion an illusory self might be. Buddhists agree that illusions can be generated by the
operation of our sense faculties, as well as by ways in which our cognitive machinery
characteristically operates. Buddhists did not try to explain those modes of operation
by appealing to processes of evolution by natural or cultural selection. The question at
issue here, though, is not the etiology of the illusion but the nature of the illusion,
whether it can be dissipated, and if so how. Understanding the mechanisms that explain
how we came to be subject to the illusion may be of interest, but such understanding is
not necessarily crucial to answering the practical question. That classical Indian
Buddhists have more in their ontology than do current physicalists seems neither here
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nor there, a matter of ontological bookkeeping with no real bearing on the question of
how the illusion is generated and how its effects might be overcome.12
Here is one last point I would like to make, in this case not about Struhl’s paper but
about the paper of a fellow respondent. Sean Smith mentions, in his paper, a view that
Struhl and I happen to share concerning the Buddhist goal of the cessation of suffering.
The view is, roughly, that it is existential suffering that is the principal target of
Buddhist practice, and that such suffering is connected to non-self by way of the point
that when happiness is understood as involving a sense of purpose and fulfillment, our
search for happiness will inevitably be frustrated, given our mortality. The realization
of non-self is thus meant to dissolve the underlying presupposition that there is a “me”
for whom events in this life might have meaning. The connection can be seen in the
fact that young people are routinely told that they must figure out who they truly are if
they are to work out what sort of life will make them happy—what sorts of projects
will confer meaning and dignity on their lives. Smith disagrees with this understanding
of the Buddhist path, claiming “that there is a notion of meaning and purposefulness in
one’s life available to the Buddhist that does not entail the existence of a self.” It is not
my place to respond on Struhl’s behalf, but I thought I might say a word about my own
stance here.
Smith cites the famous “glass tunnel” passage (Parfit 1984, 281) where Parfit
describes his own response after coming to believe that one’s continued existence does
not involve a “further fact.” Smith understands Parfit to be saying that such a
dissipation of the sense of self leads one to be more inclined to “serve others,”
something Smith says he finds “affirming and worthy of pursuit.” If “serving others”
means preventing the suffering of others, then Buddhists would surely agree that this
is worthy of pursuit. As Prajñākaramati says, “If suffering is to be prevented, then all
is to be prevented” (yadi vāryaṃ duḥkham, tadā sarvaṃ vāryam BCAP ad BCA 8.103).
But affirming of what, exactly? When we call a pursuit affirming, this is usually taken
to mean that the activity confers value on the person who engages in it. When I find
myself wishing that I could act on Prajñākaramati’s advice and follow the bodhisattva
path, it’s because I feel that doing so would make me a better person, namely by
imparting a larger meaning to my life. We are thus brought back to the notion of self
as both narrator and central character in the ongoing story of a life. But I have written
more extensively about this elsewhere,13 and bring it up here only to underline the point
that there may be reasons to exercise caution in ascribing to Buddhists the view that
the goal of their practice is a source of meaning and happiness. There may be a reason
12

Unless, of course, one believes that a full-bore defense of the classical Indian karma-rebirth ideology
must be part of an account of non-self as illusion. (Physicalism does not by itself make karma and rebirth
impossible, but it does make it seem implausible.) Unless one thinks there can be no Buddhism without
the karma-rebirth complex, it is not clear why a Buddhist physicalism is necessarily ruled out. The
Buddha was, after all, committed to the existence of five kinds of psychophysical aggregate. Yogācāra
rejects the existence of one of the five (rūpa), yet no one denies that Yogācāra is Buddhist. True, all
Indian Buddhist schools were anti-physicalist. But when was it decided that the history of Buddhist
philosophy ended in the 12th century?
13
See Siderits 2018. For an attempt to give a positive account while avoiding the paradox of liberation,
see Wagner 2018.
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why the Buddha claimed that the goal of his Path is merely the cessation of suffering
and not some positive good (see e.g., M II.32-5 (M79, Cūla Sakuludāyi Sutta)). Even
if, as I suspect, the state of “cessation with remainder” (the state of the enlightened
person while still alive) can be characterized as positively valuable, there can still be
good reason to refrain from characterizing it in terms that may get in the way of its
attainment.
I join my fellow respondents in thanking Karsten Struhl for his stimulating paper.
In prescinding from the details of Buddhological exegesis and looking at how Buddhist
thought and practice might be understood when seen through the lens of some current
strains of thought, it raises important questions not only about the topic of self as
illusion, but also about the various ways in which we have come to think about that
topic. It is, I think, good to have our methodologies interrogated from time to time.
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